The first part of Stuart‘s lengthy tome had over 200 comments… which suggests there is an appetite for the second part… so here it is:

The first part of this post concluded by proffering another explanation for the sovereignty paradox (meaning in essence the desire to withdraw from the United Kingdom but then cede significant economic and legal powers to the European Union and ECHR) namely that the SNP’s raison d’être is less about independence per se than incompatible political ideologies as between Scotland and the rest of the UK, and as compared to England in particular. Earlier I asked what the difference was between last year’s Labour Scottish triumph at Westminster and this year’s SNP landslide in the Holyrood poll. Of course, apart from the parliament in question the most obvious response is the rightwards lurch in the context of UK politics as a whole.

Thus in a recent blog post (albeit of sufficient newsworthiness to be the subject of a Scotsman news article) SNP policy and strategy guru Stephen Noon suggests “there is a harshness to the UK government’s approach that goes against the grain of Scottish society”, compares Alex Salmond’s “Fair Society” with David Cameron’s “Big Society”, and concludes:

“This is a tale of two countries, of two very different visions of society and of the future. It reflects contrasting priorities. And that, ultimately, is what Home Rule – devolution and independence – is all about.”

Thus it’s not so much about independence, sovereignty and ‘forging our destiny’ than in effect gerrymandering the UK to afford primacy to Scotland’s dominant progressive, left-of-centre political philosophy, undiluted by being part of the UK. Therefore independence is less about nationalism and an end in itself than about conflicting ideologies.

Which would, of course, solve the sovereignty paradox, most obviously as regards the EU and the euro, with their supposed communitarian and progressive ethos (assuming a currency can be thus characterised!). And presumably the EU’s obvious shortcomings are ignored in favour of a rose-tinted perspective on the whole European project, in contrast to Westminster’s semi-detached relationship with the EU. Whereas the reality is arguably that in some respects the latter is even less attractive than the former as regards Scotland’s posited political zeitgeist. (To a lesser extent this kind of false dichotomy might also apply to the Holyrood/Westminster comparison).

For example, in many ways the EU is wedded to a fundamentalist market perspective, with free movement of workers within the area being one obvious facet of this ethos. Of course, this can be detrimental to the wages and conditions of indigenous workers and even drive them out of work, but the dominant Scottish mindset prefers to portray the situation in terms of things like cultural diversity, whereas the latter idealism in England seems to have given way to the less rosy former perspective, with the difference north and south of the border arguably being due merely to the differing scales of immigration rather than fundamentally different levels of tolerance and suchlike.

But solving the sovereignty paradox in terms of fundamental political differences – real or imagined – may seem like stating the obvious, so is there any mileage in viewing independence for Scotland as a principle in itself, an intrinsic good, or is it merely the means to an alternative ideological end?

Thus would those who are pro-independence but distinctly progressive/neo-socialist in political outlook be so keen on Scotland going it alone if that more obviously entailed a distinctly right-leaning political environment? By the same token, would a left-of-centre future in the UK generally make the continuation of the Union a more attractive proposition, particularly if an independent Scotland seemed likely to steer a political course to the right of this?

Of course, it’s self-evident that many supporters of the SNP – and, to an extent, independence – have come to the party after becoming disillusioned with new Labour – and, also to a degree, Unionism – thus a thesis of ideology trumping sovereignty is perhaps trying to over-elaborate on something self-evident and unremarkable.

On the other hand, there are plenty of people to the right-of-centre on the political spectrum who are pro-independence but are presumably resigned to the fact that a more sovereign Scotland would mean a political environment at odds with their own ideological stance, and indeed perhaps even more unpalatable than it is now. Hence their support for independence is presumably based on grounds other than humdrum political preferences.

Of course, solving the sovereignty conundrum in terms of political philosophy is only one aspect of looking at the problem. One related – but distinctly less attractive – way of looking at the same situation is in terms of Anglophobes on the one hand and Europhiles on the other.

And the ideological perspective itself reduces a complex and often contradictory dynamic to a simple scenario of left v right, or Westminster v Holyrood & Brussels in terms of institutions. But the stink over the Supreme Court itself reveals a pro-independence split between the more obvious rights-oriented psyche which supports the court’s intervention on the human rights convention’s right to a fair trial, as opposed to the undercurrent of a more illiberal stance from Mr Salmond and Mr MacAskill.

This is perhaps neatly encapsulated in a Scotsman article by Nationalist historian Michael Fry, who arguably displays little appreciation of the impact of ECHR jurisprudence on Scots law irrespective of the Supreme Court aspect – and instead highlights the dangers of British/English law to Scottish legal independence – but who in any case seems to demonstrates a distinctly anti-rights ethos:

“Till a year or two ago, there were no appeals in criminal proceedings beyond the High Court in Edinburgh. Today there is the possibility of or even the invitation to one for cases somehow involving human rights, and such an appeal will go to the Supreme Court in London. So a back door has been left ajar that could be hard to push to: there may be many cases in which clever and unscrupulous Scots defence lawyers will look for, indeed delight in finding, some aspect of human rights. The vaunted independence of the Scottish judiciary could in this area face the fatal risk of absorption into a British system of justice. And here, as in other areas, British may mean in reality English.”

By the same token, it may also be the case that the first minister and justice secretary are more concerned about the reputation of Scotland’s justice system than justice per se, thus their reaction to the Fraser and Cadder cases are perhaps less about the Supreme Court and the procedural and sovereignty aspects than how its decisions are perceived to reflect badly on the efficacy of an independent Scottish nation. Hence this all may represent a continuation of the misgivings regarding the Lockerbie bomber’s conviction, with al-Megrahi’s release on compassionate grounds reflecting more positively on the SNP’s desired perception of Scotland than the can of worms that an inquiry into the whole affair could represent, as dissenting Nationalist voices demonstrate.

Thus while the progressive Holyrood/Europe v illiberal Westminster analysis of necessity simplifies many competing interests and philosophies, from a personal perspective I would hazard that if born in 1994 rather than 1964 then I might find the idea of the SNP and Scottish independence significantly more attractive than is currently the case. However, experience (and all that!) has resulted in cynicism and disillusionment with idealistic/left wing politics, hence a scepticism regarding the independence project. Thus clearly a ‘fluid’ approach to sovereignty more related to personal philosophy than nationalistic principle and questions regarding precisely where political power should reside: Edinburgh, London, Brussels; who cares, as long as it’s good government.

Of course, I’m sure historians and political theorists can cite numerous examples of nationalist movements arising from or given impetus by ideological considerations. But when Stephen Noon chained himself to the Stone of Destiny back in 1992, perhaps he should have tattooed Labour’s clause IV on his forehead instead, or at least the contemporary equivalent encompassing the SNP’s vision of a “fair society”.

For all that the constitution is one of David Cameron’s top priorities, it is odd that not many Conservative MPs seem overly willing to discuss it. Even John Redwood’s blog post this morning takes a distinctly, not to mention disappointingly, non-opinionated view of the matter. John is really just raising a few points up the flagpole to see in which way commenters salute them and, to be fair, a very decent debate followed in the 90+ comments.

So, in the absence of much else exercising my blogging brain these days, I thought I’d also take up the challenge:

1. Should the people of the rest of the UK have any say in the independence of Scotland?

Definitely not. This argument has flummoxed me for quite some time as it is often raised by otherwise sensible people. If England wishes to be independent from the UK, then it is for England to decide. It is the same for Wales, Northern Ireland and, yes, Scotland. Of course negotiations will have an impact on the rest of the UK and, had there been a need for two referendums (as Michael Moore recently suggested and I, more recently, backed him on), then the whole of the UK could arguably have a referendum on the matter but if, as seems very likely, the referendum comes down to a straight Yes/No before detailed negotiations begin, then it is a matter for Scots only to decide.

2. Should there be any financial consequences from Scotland gaining more independence to make her own decisions within the Union settlement?

Against the waves of vagueness that the good ship Independence battles through with each week that rolls on by, this one really is up and over the sides. What exactly the question is getting at we can but wonder.

I suspect there would be financial consequences to Scotland gaining more independence within the Union but, to second-guess what John is getting at, one would hope they wouldn’t be unnecessarily punitive. One does have to wonder if Scotland becoming more independent has subtle detriments. When Lord Green, the UK’s first Trade Minister, is touting for business across the globe on the country’s behalf, he may well have Gillingham in mind ahead of Glasgow, Aberystwyth ahead of Aberdeen and Southampton ahead of Selkirk. It is understandable that those working under the auspices of the Westminster Government don’t even have Scotland in the back of their mind when it comes to British concerns that, under our constitution, should still be fairly considered in a UK context as a whole.

So to answer John’s question, although there probably will be financial consequences for Scotland pulling away on its own, over and above Calman or fiscal autonomy, there shouldn’t be.

3. Should Scotland have more powers to raise her own taxation?

Absolutely. A Parliament that does not have powers to raise its own taxation will inevitably run into problems in terms of democratic accountability and responsible spending. For a long time I had regarded the Scottish Parliament as just another block of Westminster spending, like the NHS, Defra, welfare or what have you. However, I have slowly, too slowly, realised that this is inapplicable and the Scottish Parliament really is a special case when it comes to raising its own budget. There may end up being elected health chiefs, police chiefs and even headmasters in England and Wales before too long but there is still no direct comparison to be made to the Scottish Parliament.

The expense and investment that goes into the NHS, Defra, welfare etc are as a direct result of decisions and policies taken by a Government that has been democratically voted into place. Holyrood spending is dictated by a different party (or parties) to those that were voted into place in Scotland and this leads to problems as we are seeing now where Westminster policy is university fees and Holyrood policy is free tuition, Westminster policy is increased private sector involvement in the NHS and Holyrood policy is to keep health public. That divergence when spending limits are so inextricably linked between the Parliaments is an ultimately unworkable situation.

If a Conservative Government wants to end the supposed ‘grudge and grievance’ politics, then it needs to sever the link between right-of-centre Westminster decisions and left-of-centre Holyrood spending constraints. Indeed, this would end the regular ‘grudge and grievance’ that heads north, the supposed charge that Scotland subsidises the rest of the UK. Let’s put it to the test if both sides of the border feel that strongly about it.

4. Do you support the Union or do you think it is time for break-up as the SNP suggest?

Well, I’m shimmying onto the fence here. I’ll make sure I’m in Scotland for the vote and I am currently minded to vote Yes but, as has been pointed out on this blog before (predominantly by James), the lack of detail and blatant gamesmanship surrounding the SNP’s primary proposal may push me back into a No space as there may ultimately be too much to risk by going for it alone, as fun and as fulfilling an adventure it would be.

So that’s my fourpence worth. I guess these four questions could form some sort of meme, not that I’m going to pick anyone out but feel free to answer John’s questions in the comments (or on your blogs). Maybe I should tag Mr Redwood MP himself since (1) he never answered his own questions and (2) he’s significantly closer to the decision-making than any of us here…!

A two-part guest post from Stuart Winton of Planet Politics.  It was a lengthy post so we got him to split it in two, and we’ll post up the second part of it in a few days.

If nothing else then Scottish independence is surely about sovereignty. Thus the intention is to repatriate powers currently reserved to Westminster, such as the ability to raise taxes, to borrow when necessary to finance public spending and regarding macroeconomic policy more generally.

However, the recent debate about the definition and limits of ideas like devo-max, independence-lite and confedaralism demonstrates the difficulty with the concept of sovereignty; for example, in what looks like the SNP’s vision of an independent Scotland foreign affairs might remain partly at the UK level, while monetary policy would be decided either by the Bank of England or the European Central Bank, whereas the issue of national defence seems particularly vexed.

The currency issue seems especially difficult as regards the questions of independence and sovereignty. For some time the SNP seemed committed to the single European currency, but for obvious reasons the retention of sterling now seems to be the preferred option, in the medium-term at least. But that Alex Salmond could even contemplate an independent Scotland joining the euro – with interest rates decided in Frankfurt – underlines the paradoxical nature of so-called sovereignty, not to mention the notion of independence generally. If monetary policy decided in London primarily for economic conditions in the south-east of England is considered inappropriate – the original rationale for a Scottish currency – then surely interest rates decided primarily for France and Germany would be even less palatable for Scotland, as several of the smaller eurozone member states have found to their cost in the difficult economic climate of recent years.

By the same token, Mr Salmond’s recent objection to aspects of human rights law being decided by the Supreme Court in London – and thus a perceived threat to the independence of the Scottish legal system – seems somewhat ironic in view of the alternative, as outlined by a Scottish Government spokesman: “The issue is not human rights – it is that the distinct Scottish legal system should have direct access to the European Court in Strasbourg just like every other legal jurisdiction”.

The irony of the latter point seemed lost on one contributor to the Herald’s website, for example, who talked of “Unionist jackboots trampling Scottish Jurisprudence” and opined: “It is about the core foundation of the Scottish state and its senior judges being humiliated and deemed inferior by a London court”.

Slightly more recently – and less luridly – justice secretary Kenny MacAskill claimed the Supreme Court judges’ knowledge of Scots law was limited to what they might pick up on a trip to the Edinburgh Festival, while paradoxically stating: “We want Scotland to be able to deal directly with Strasbourg. At the present moment we cannot do that. What we want is to be in the same situation as other countries. We want to be a normal European country.” Similarly, in a subsequent Newsnicht interview the first minister seemed all over the place regarding judicial sovereignty, slamming the “aggressive” intervention by judges in “another country”, while extolling the virtues of the European court and highlighting the fact that the European Convention on Human Rights was authored by a Scot.

But of course we are represented in Europe as a constituent part of the UK, so to that extent Scotland is not a ‘normal’ European country, and there’s little to suggest that the Scottish people desire otherwise. Clearly all this could change with independence, but the SNP Government doesn’t want a referendum on the issue at present, thus to that extent Mr MacAskill should either bring it on (to coin a phrase!) or get on with using the currently devolved powers to run the country.

And it’s not as if Messrs Salmond and MacAskill’s obvious chagrin at the Supreme Court’s decision per se was likely to have been assuaged by having the issue decided by the European Court of Human Rights, which learned opinion seems to suggest would take a similarly liberal approach to interpreting the human rights convention, and it also seems unlikely that the latter court would be any better versed in Scots law than two of the Supreme Court’s justices, Lord Hope and Lord Rodger, who have held the posts of Lord Justice General of Scotland and Lord President of the Court of Session in Scotland. Moreover, the ECHR is labouring under a lengthy backlog of cases, thus neither procedurally nor in terms of substantive interpretation of the convention is there any obvious benefit to be had in relation to SNP distaste at the effective exoneration of Nat Fraser, except to the extent that judgement day might have been delayed for some years – and justice denied? – if access to the Supreme Court had been unavailable and hence awkward questions about the Scottish criminal justice system avoided.

But all this brings to mind the SNP’s desire for an ‘independent’ Scotland to join the European Union and thus have national sovereignty compromised by the full panoply of treaty obligations, regulations and directives which would take precedence over domestic legislation and case law, and that’s even ignoring the issues of eurozone membership and monetary policy.

And this EU law would ultimately be under the auspices of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, a jurisdiction in addition to and completely separate from that of the European Convention on Human Rights and associated court in Strasbourg.

Thus in simple terms the dominant Nationalist mindset seems to say, ‘London bad: Frankfurt, Brussels and Strasbourg good’. Or a political and economic union of 60 million people bad, a political and economic union of 500 million people good. Hence something of a sovereignty paradox, but can all this be reconciled?  Of course, many prominent supporters of independence have a problem with these contradictions, perhaps most neatly encapsulated in opposition to the SNP’s oxymoronic “Independence in Europe” mantra, albeit that it’s not heard so much these days. More specifically, Professor John Kay, a member of the SNP Government’s Council of Economic Advisers, said recently: “In the modern world, economic sovereignty for small nations is inescapably limited, and political sovereignty is largely symbolic.” Of course, as Professor Kay’s Scotland on Sunday article makes clear, the limits of economic sovereignty depend on which uncertain course an independent Scotland takes, while his point about political sovereignty perhaps over eggs the pudding a bit.

On the other hand, Gerry Hassan refers to a “post-nationalist politics, one of shared, fluid sovereignties”, which may have some merit in an increasingly complex and interdependent world, but there’s certainly nothing ‘fluid’ about ceding sovereignty to the EU and in terms of a single currency; these are long-term commitments fundamentally antithetical to national sovereignty – ‘European superstate’, anyone? Thus ‘fluid sovereignties’ seems more a euphemism for contradiction and confusion rather than any kind of compelling explanation.

Of course, another prominent attempt to square the sovereignty circle manifests itself in the claim that Scotland would be pooling sovereignty with the EU on a consensual basis, a course of action freely and democratically chosen by the people of Scotland rather than having it thrust upon us via Westminster and the UK.

Again this seems semi-plausible, but the argument portrays Scotland as some sort of repressed colony at the height of imperial Britain, not a twenty-first century participative democracy whose citizens – to repeat a point made earlier – have never demonstrated any obvious desire to secede from the UK, as the several-year delay in the independence referendum ably demonstrates; if the Scotland Bill and the various other powers requested by Alex Salmond are as imperative to Scotland’s future as claimed, then surely these should be sidelined and referendum-enabling legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament forthwith to hasten the repatriation of the full panoply of desired powers?

By the same token, May’s election was self-evidently about who should run a devolved Scotland – and in view of the claimed increasing sophistication of Scottish voters there’s no reason why the SNP shouldn’t become the ‘natural party of (Holyrood) government’ (and indeed perhaps plenty of reasons why the SNP should be the most obvious natural party of Holyrood government) – without it indicating an endorsement of independence. Moreover, Labour trounced the SNP in Scotland in the last major electoral test in the UK context, namely the general election which took place precisely one year before the Holyrood landslide; what changed between then and now, apart from the seat of parliament in question? (The other obvious difference is addressed later).

But another angle on the sovereignty issue is that an independent Scotland would take its place at the international diplomacy dinner table as a fully sovereign nation state (sic!) and therefore have its own say in world affairs and hence be able influence the geopolitical environment.  Where, precisely? The G8? The G20? The G100-odd? Or perhaps joining (or displacing) the UK as a permanent member of the UN Security Council? Of course, the stock Nationalist answer is very probably that Scotland would rather not be part of the UK representation on the Security Council, thank you very much, but would Scotland have any more international influence as a separate entity than (indirectly) as a member of the UK?

However, it’s surely the case that Scotland would have less influence at the EU level (with near-30 member states) than it currently has as a constituent part of the UK, where indeed it’s often been claimed that Scotland has had influence disproportionate to its size; during the ‘new Labour’ years, for example.

Again, however, from the Nationalist perspective that’s the wrong kind of influence, and thus the second part of this post will suggest that Scottish independence is less about sovereignty per se than incompatible political ideologies.