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Major calls for Devolution Max is of minor benefit to unionists

Jul 10

Posted by Jeff in Constitution | 16 Comments

It is a shame that there is no direct link to the speech that John Major gave recently in which he made his arguments for Scotland having more powers. It is not really clear from the various reports whether the calls are a positive strategy for Scotland or rather negative tactics for the United Kingdom.

Major’s intervention comes hot on the heels of the two political leaders sitting side by side at Wimbledon in what is surely (surely?) a mere coincidence. Mind you, had Rory McIlroy been sitting one seat further forward, perhaps the golfing complex at the Menie Estate might have had a new, more popular, figurehead (albeit with as dodgy a hairdo as the current leader).

But it is John Major’s points that are of most interest and two of them stick out for me; one in which the former PM makes a lot of sense and one which has long frustrated me, and continues to do so, as unionists seek an alternative argument to the SNP’s persuasive overtures.

Part of Sir John’s speech includes the lines:
“The present quasi-federalist settlement with Scotland is unsustainable. Each year of devolution has moved Scotland further from England. Scottish ambition is fraying English tolerance. This is a tie that will snap – unless the issue is resolved. The union between England and Scotland cannot be maintained by constant aggravation in Scotland and appeasement in London. I believe it is time to confront the argument head on.”

The above passage is excellent, Sir John couldn’t really have phrased it better. The referendum that resulted in a Scottish Parliament is as good as ancient history as the political parties position and posture over what powers should and should not sit either side of the border. With no meaningful constitution or agreement to work with, it is a bit of a free for all with broadcasting, the Crown Estate, gun control, speed limits and countless other policy areas up for grabs. It is an ongoing and endless dialogue that the public don’t ever really get a say in (was the May 2011 result a mandate for Holyrood to have broadcasting powers? Discuss).

The second reading of the Scotland Bill on the 8th of September is no doubt the next opportunity that these issues will get a formal hearing and, as Sir John recommends, a reduction in the number of Scottish MPs coupled with a transfer of powers to Holyrood is the best move in this election-less window up to the independence referendum expected around 2014 as it will provide a more robust Scottish Parliament and a better equilibrium between Scotland and the UK.

However, what Sir John does not explain is why these moves are necessary other than to suggest that they will be a successful way to head off the supposedly inevitable destination of independence. Much like Calman, the thinking seems to be that it makes sense to give Scotland a little more in order to stop them wanting a lot more. This is at odds with Major’s strategy when he was in Number 10, opposing devolution for Scotland as he saw it as a stepping stone towards independence, so it is to the SNP’s momentum’s credit that this position has changed so significantly.

The two problems that I have, and have had for quite some time, are these:

1 – What, presicely, makes the union so precious that politicians have to give goodies that they don’t want to give in order to protect it?
2 – Which Parliament do the leaders of each of the main parties believe is best placed to make fiscal, broadcasting, speed limit, gun law decisions and other areas that remain reserved at Westminster?

John Major is making welcome proposals but for all the wrong reasons, he doesn’t even really believe what he is proposing but is rather just trying to find a way, any way, to block independence from happening. The funny thing is, down here in London, it is quite easy to exaggerate what Scotland’s appetite for independence is, even I’ve been guilty of it when I should really no better. A majority SNP Government with a minority of the votes and many, many voters supporting them at the ballot box but not being in favour of independence does not add up to the freefalling towards independence that many down here believe to be the case. Recent polling has suggested that the appetite for Scottish independence is as strong south of Gretna as it is north of it.

The SNP will, of course, bank any extra powers and any moves towards fiscal autonomy that it can get and it is no wonder that it is so delighted with John Major’s unnecessary intervention over the weekend. The unionists have inexplicably put themselves over a barrel when really all they need to do is wait for this coming referendum, campaign in a positive manner for the union, win said referendum and then go about their business as they so please without worrying about the supposed SNP thorn in their sides. Unfortunately, they are struggling to put even one strand of this simple strategy into operation.

Sir John Major is a respected politician either side of the border and is in a position to speak his mind without fear of reprisal so, for me, it is telling that his thinking on the subject is do depressingly shallow and what he proposes (more powers) does not, according to him, have merit in itself but is merely a way to block something else (independence). I really don’t mind either way whether Scotland is independent or part of the United Kingdom but the sheer absence of an argument from the unionist side can only lead me, and presumably others, into that Yes vote in 2014.

Indeed, going back to the supposedly random seating arrangement at Wimbledon, I daresay Northern Irishman Rory McIlroy could make a better fist of explaining why Scotland should stay in the UK but that’s another story and probably not even for any another time.

Why is the campaign for English independence doing so well?

Jul 6

Posted by James in Constitution | 47 Comments

Neither the Saltire nor the Cross of St GeorgeWell done ComRes, asking the English not just for views on Scottish independence, but on English independence too. 36% of the English polled said yes to English independence, just 1% behind the June 2011 TNS-BMRB figure for Scots wanting Scottish independence. And that 37% figure for Scots backing independence was a 6% boost on the previous time it was asked. Assuming the English figure isn’t a rogue poll – and more data from other pollsters would be most welcome, it looks like rejection of the UK model is roughly equally popular in England and North Britain Scotland.

Yet the differences are enormous.

In Scotland, the party in government has independence as its sole raison d’être, plus there’s another party in Parliament which supports it, plus three others committed to further devolution, a position which means all sides in the debate are currently arguing against the status quo – but in England not a single party proposes going it alone, not even the English Democrats, whose eccentric Mayor of Doncaster got a slot in the Scotsman yesterday to be incoherent and ill-informed.

That party of government at Holyrood is also led by the man regarded as the finest politician of the age by many, including himself and his bust-erecting acolytes (check out the hubris in this quote, by the way). He’s the great persuader, the regular winner of FMQs whether the facts are on his side or not. Sure, he’s Marmite too, but who is his counterpart, the strong voice for English independence? Jeremy Clarkson? Simon Heffer? Richard Littlejohn?! Is there a single elected politician who favours this position? Apparently not. The English Independence Party have even let their domain name lapse – I’m not going to point you to the spamly holding page.

Here in Scotland there is also a true national debate going on, in the media, in pubs, on blogs like this, or Bella Caledonia, or Labour Hame – something which began in earnest in 2007 and which kicked up a gear in May when it became clear that a referendum would happen this session. But in England, do people sit around and discuss the merits and demerits of the Union unless they’re that particularly ardent form of non-resident SNP supporter? Or reciting the “they’re all living high on the hog on our money” nonsense that the English Democrats promote? I’ve never heard it.

The symbols, naff as I find all flags, are also laden with different values. The Saltire and the Lion Rampant are familiar fixtures at football matches and on public buildings, and come with no anti-immigrant baggage, whereas it has taken a real and recent effort to reclaim the Cross of St George from the hard right.

So why, despite all the advantages the case for self-determination apparently has in Scotland, is the argument for putting the UK to bed not getting noticeably more traction north of the border than south?

Independence in Europe?

Jun 29

Posted by Malc in Constitution, Europe | 50 Comments

At the risk of putting my own head above the parapet and being whacked the same way Stuart Winton has been, I’ve a few comments about the idea of independence in Europe that I thought I might air.  But please be nice.

One of the bedrocks of the SNP’s independence message is that Scotland would have a stronger voice within Europe – and indeed, the wider world.  You only have to read some of the comments on Stuart’s post to see those arguments voiced.  As it stands, if Scotland wants a policy pursued at EU level, it must agree it with the UK government at Westminster, and that particular policy will only be pursued if the UK government itself sees it as consistent with the wider UK interest.  Certainly a system whereby Scotland would have its own voice at this level – and the opportunity to use it – would appear to be a more attractive notion.  However, is it as simple as declaring independence (making the assumption that there is a yes vote in a referendum) one day and speaking up in Europe the next?

It seems, the answer to this question very much depends upon who you ask.

The SNP’s team of constitutional lawyers indicate that there would be no difficulty with the above situation.  In their view, it is perfectly legitimate to consider that, while Scotland will be seceding from one Union (the UK) it has given no indication that it wishes to leave another (the EU) and thus would continue its membership as previously, with various amendments since it would now sit as an independent nation-state.  This would presumably entail increased membership of the European Parliament, voting and veto rights and various other aspects of membership.

Others indicate differently.  They consider that the UK is the member state of the EU (which no one would dispute) and as such, any component part of that union which separates itself would also avail itself of the various treaty obligations which the UK holds – including membership of the EU.  Thus, Scotland would have to re-apply for membership of all the international bodies to which it would like to align.  Needless to say, independence which brings no commercial ties to Europe would be a less attractive option than independence with full EU membership as a guarantee.  Indeed, many of the European Parliament staff members – of several nations – indicated that this was what they thought the case would be, especially since the Spanish (who face a similar situation with Basques and Catalans) would likely block the first option.

Then there is a third camp, which argues that, while Scotland would have to re-negotiate membership of the EU, so too would the rest of the UK.  The point in this case is that the member state which negotiated membership of the EU originally no longer exists in the same form as it did when it negotiated membership, thus all memberships become null and void.  While this third scenario would confirm Scotland on a similar legal standing to the rest of the UK, this would come as little economic consolation if both had to re-negotiate membership – with the added problem that this time it is likely that no opt-outs would be granted (meaning adopting both Schengen and the Euro as mandatory conditions of membership).

So – several opinions but no hard facts.  Part of the reason for this is that there is no legal precedent for what might occur should part of a member state decide to secede.  Of course there are cases of secession we can look to (Czech Republic and Slovakia, Kosovo, Montenegro – even Greenland) but none where membership of the EU has been at stake.  There is a flip side – East Germany was incorporated in Germany’s membership – but that was a distinct situation (which could perhaps be repeated should Northern Ireland ever merge with the Republic of Ireland, but that’s a different issue entirely).

From discussion with MEPs of all Scottish parties and others, as well as non-partisan voices in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, it is clear that nothing is clear in this areas.  Labour’s Catherine Stihler has asked the question of the European Commission on several occasions, with the only response being that they do not comment on hypothetical situations.

Well, this is no longer a hypothetical situation – we will have a vote on independence and a very real chance that Scotland will vote for it.  There are perfectly legitimate and rational arguments on either side of this debate, and it is one which does need much further exploration – and a clear answer will surely be required before we move to the referendum.  Indeed, the answer in the latter may well depend on the answer to the former.

The details of independence?

Jun 28

Posted by Guest Blog in Constitution | 12 Comments

A guest post from Dr Peter Lynch of the University of Stirling.  Peter has published widely on devolution, regionalism and the SNP, including this 1999 history of the party, as well as being a familiar voice on Radio Scotland as an election commentator.

The recent BBC Question Time of 16th June 2011 demonstrated some of the difficulties the SNP will face in getting a Yes vote at the independence referendum – the difficulty of having detailed answers to every post-independence question under the sun.

The questioner in the audience who pointed out that independence would require embassies, defence forces, the immigration service, customs service, EU membership and currency, probably did the SNP a service here.

The obvious thing about some of these issues is that they are difficult if not impossible to answer at this stage. Determining how many rifles the Scottish army will have after independence is just about as hard as determining how many the British Army has now, let alone whether they actually work. As such details are a problem, then the No campaign may well choose to drown out the independence option with endless questions they know cannot be answered and tie up the Yes campaigners in very detailed knots!

This is a problem for the SNP, but it has, in the past, provided some useful answers. Back in 1996, Allan Macartney helped to produce the Transition Report on Scottish independence, which sought to explain that independence was not a one-day wonder, but rather a gradual process of getting from the constitutional present to independence, in an orderly fashion, over several years. Getting hold of the Transition report is a challenge, though some of it was assessed by the Constitution Unit here (pdf). And, it makes interesting reading as it explains how to get to independence through a transitional process of negotiation, asset divisions, establishing institutions, policies, etc. You don’t just arrive there the day after the referendum. An actual independence day would only occur some years after the referendum.

Despite the need for a transition, devolution does provide a strong institutional platform for independence. The Scottish government already exists, with a range of organisations and civil servants responsible for policymaking. Independence is not a year zero for government or government institutions. Rather it is a case of bolting on new policy responsibilities like defence, foreign affairs, immigration, taxation, etc., onto existing government institutions and organisations (think about existing British military bases in Scotland as well as HMRC’s Centre One in East Kilbride). Sorting out these complexities is something the SNP will need to think through in the years from now to the referendum.

Of course, the politicians currently moaning about the lack of details about independence will moan even more when the Scottish government sets up commissions to study the transition to independence and any details of the independence process. The opposition parties will complain about wasting taxpayer’s money. For evidence of this, think back to the opposition’s behaviour over the white paper Choosing Scotland’s Future in 2007, as well as the ten policy papers that followed from 2008-9. Of course, complaining about them was easier than reading them and deeply ironic as they contained a fair bit of detail on the constitutional options of both independence and devo-max.

Ideology trumps sovereignty? (part 2)

Jun 22

Posted by Guest Blog in Constitution, Ideology | 54 Comments

The first part of Stuart‘s lengthy tome had over 200 comments… which suggests there is an appetite for the second part… so here it is:

The first part of this post concluded by proffering another explanation for the sovereignty paradox (meaning in essence the desire to withdraw from the United Kingdom but then cede significant economic and legal powers to the European Union and ECHR) namely that the SNP’s raison d’être is less about independence per se than incompatible political ideologies as between Scotland and the rest of the UK, and as compared to England in particular. Earlier I asked what the difference was between last year’s Labour Scottish triumph at Westminster and this year’s SNP landslide in the Holyrood poll. Of course, apart from the parliament in question the most obvious response is the rightwards lurch in the context of UK politics as a whole.

Thus in a recent blog post (albeit of sufficient newsworthiness to be the subject of a Scotsman news article) SNP policy and strategy guru Stephen Noon suggests “there is a harshness to the UK government’s approach that goes against the grain of Scottish society”, compares Alex Salmond’s “Fair Society” with David Cameron’s “Big Society”, and concludes:

“This is a tale of two countries, of two very different visions of society and of the future. It reflects contrasting priorities. And that, ultimately, is what Home Rule – devolution and independence – is all about.”

Thus it’s not so much about independence, sovereignty and ‘forging our destiny’ than in effect gerrymandering the UK to afford primacy to Scotland’s dominant progressive, left-of-centre political philosophy, undiluted by being part of the UK. Therefore independence is less about nationalism and an end in itself than about conflicting ideologies.

Which would, of course, solve the sovereignty paradox, most obviously as regards the EU and the euro, with their supposed communitarian and progressive ethos (assuming a currency can be thus characterised!). And presumably the EU’s obvious shortcomings are ignored in favour of a rose-tinted perspective on the whole European project, in contrast to Westminster’s semi-detached relationship with the EU. Whereas the reality is arguably that in some respects the latter is even less attractive than the former as regards Scotland’s posited political zeitgeist. (To a lesser extent this kind of false dichotomy might also apply to the Holyrood/Westminster comparison).

For example, in many ways the EU is wedded to a fundamentalist market perspective, with free movement of workers within the area being one obvious facet of this ethos. Of course, this can be detrimental to the wages and conditions of indigenous workers and even drive them out of work, but the dominant Scottish mindset prefers to portray the situation in terms of things like cultural diversity, whereas the latter idealism in England seems to have given way to the less rosy former perspective, with the difference north and south of the border arguably being due merely to the differing scales of immigration rather than fundamentally different levels of tolerance and suchlike.

But solving the sovereignty paradox in terms of fundamental political differences – real or imagined – may seem like stating the obvious, so is there any mileage in viewing independence for Scotland as a principle in itself, an intrinsic good, or is it merely the means to an alternative ideological end?

Thus would those who are pro-independence but distinctly progressive/neo-socialist in political outlook be so keen on Scotland going it alone if that more obviously entailed a distinctly right-leaning political environment? By the same token, would a left-of-centre future in the UK generally make the continuation of the Union a more attractive proposition, particularly if an independent Scotland seemed likely to steer a political course to the right of this?

Of course, it’s self-evident that many supporters of the SNP – and, to an extent, independence – have come to the party after becoming disillusioned with new Labour – and, also to a degree, Unionism – thus a thesis of ideology trumping sovereignty is perhaps trying to over-elaborate on something self-evident and unremarkable.

On the other hand, there are plenty of people to the right-of-centre on the political spectrum who are pro-independence but are presumably resigned to the fact that a more sovereign Scotland would mean a political environment at odds with their own ideological stance, and indeed perhaps even more unpalatable than it is now. Hence their support for independence is presumably based on grounds other than humdrum political preferences.

Of course, solving the sovereignty conundrum in terms of political philosophy is only one aspect of looking at the problem. One related – but distinctly less attractive – way of looking at the same situation is in terms of Anglophobes on the one hand and Europhiles on the other.

And the ideological perspective itself reduces a complex and often contradictory dynamic to a simple scenario of left v right, or Westminster v Holyrood & Brussels in terms of institutions. But the stink over the Supreme Court itself reveals a pro-independence split between the more obvious rights-oriented psyche which supports the court’s intervention on the human rights convention’s right to a fair trial, as opposed to the undercurrent of a more illiberal stance from Mr Salmond and Mr MacAskill.

This is perhaps neatly encapsulated in a Scotsman article by Nationalist historian Michael Fry, who arguably displays little appreciation of the impact of ECHR jurisprudence on Scots law irrespective of the Supreme Court aspect – and instead highlights the dangers of British/English law to Scottish legal independence – but who in any case seems to demonstrates a distinctly anti-rights ethos:

“Till a year or two ago, there were no appeals in criminal proceedings beyond the High Court in Edinburgh. Today there is the possibility of or even the invitation to one for cases somehow involving human rights, and such an appeal will go to the Supreme Court in London. So a back door has been left ajar that could be hard to push to: there may be many cases in which clever and unscrupulous Scots defence lawyers will look for, indeed delight in finding, some aspect of human rights. The vaunted independence of the Scottish judiciary could in this area face the fatal risk of absorption into a British system of justice. And here, as in other areas, British may mean in reality English.”

By the same token, it may also be the case that the first minister and justice secretary are more concerned about the reputation of Scotland’s justice system than justice per se, thus their reaction to the Fraser and Cadder cases are perhaps less about the Supreme Court and the procedural and sovereignty aspects than how its decisions are perceived to reflect badly on the efficacy of an independent Scottish nation. Hence this all may represent a continuation of the misgivings regarding the Lockerbie bomber’s conviction, with al-Megrahi’s release on compassionate grounds reflecting more positively on the SNP’s desired perception of Scotland than the can of worms that an inquiry into the whole affair could represent, as dissenting Nationalist voices demonstrate.

Thus while the progressive Holyrood/Europe v illiberal Westminster analysis of necessity simplifies many competing interests and philosophies, from a personal perspective I would hazard that if born in 1994 rather than 1964 then I might find the idea of the SNP and Scottish independence significantly more attractive than is currently the case. However, experience (and all that!) has resulted in cynicism and disillusionment with idealistic/left wing politics, hence a scepticism regarding the independence project. Thus clearly a ‘fluid’ approach to sovereignty more related to personal philosophy than nationalistic principle and questions regarding precisely where political power should reside: Edinburgh, London, Brussels; who cares, as long as it’s good government.

Of course, I’m sure historians and political theorists can cite numerous examples of nationalist movements arising from or given impetus by ideological considerations. But when Stephen Noon chained himself to the Stone of Destiny back in 1992, perhaps he should have tattooed Labour’s clause IV on his forehead instead, or at least the contemporary equivalent encompassing the SNP’s vision of a “fair society”.