Reading through David Torrance’s recent travails in which he had a (slightly self-satisfied) Road to Damascus ‘the UK is great!’ moment, I had my own revelation as to just why I’m not bought into the No campaign that DT now seems certain is on its way to victory.

Having asked where I was from (I always say Scotland with the caveat that I work in London), his face glowed and the compliments flowed. After salvaging a disappointing situation by booking a cheap flight from Borispol Airport to Georgia, again I was struck by how others see us. On the corridor linking my Aerosvit flight to Tbilisi’s International Airport, posters proudly proclaimed that the Bank of Georgia was listed on the London Stock Exchange.
Then, on the high-octane taxi journey into the Georgian capital’s charming Old Town, I noticed European Union flags everywhere. Later I learned this was a manifestation of a (probably quixotic) Georgian desire to join the EU. Although London’s banking sector and the European project might appear bruised and battered to us – perhaps irreparably – to Georgia’s political elite they represent something to strive for.

Don’t get me wrong, it’s great that some chap in Georgia is enamoured by the London Stock Exchange but for me personally, well, I honestly just don’t care. This guy might as well have a penchant for the French Euronext or the Stockholm OMX exchanges. Good for them. I simply don’t recognise the London Stock Exchange, and most other such institutions, as being something that I and my forebears helped to create. Indeed, the London Stock Exchange is a shining example of why I want to opt-out of the United Kingdom and into an institution that I feel a part of and feel excited to be a part of. Furthermore, the Stock Exchange has 3,000 companies listed on it from 70 different countries and LSE itself is a plc owned by major shareholders Borse Dubai (21% owners), Qatar Investment Authority (15%) and Fidelity International (5%, based in America or Bermuda, depending on which holding company is the ultimate parent). The CEO is Xavier Rolet from France.

So the London Stock Exchange is an odd company to make one go all goose bumpy about being British, unless one just likes the name.

Anyway, the argument that we should vote for the United Kingdom because our institutions are so great is fatally undermined when people have no attachment to said institutions. The two main exceptions that I personally make to my ambivalence to most things British are the NHS and the BBC.

The NHS, taken first because it’s the easiest to dismiss, has already been severed in two at the border with Nicola Sturgeon responsible for a wholly Scottish and distinctly more public health service than her counterpart Andrew Lansley who, for now, covers England and Wales. There’s no overlap there, the NHS’ are, for want of a better word, independent. There is no reason to fear the end of NHS post-independence.

The BBC is an entirely different kettle of fish, and Brian Wilson clearly took merriment in pressing Alex Salmond’s many available buttons on this very issue in the Scotsman recently, the killer line perhaps being: “I have heard of setting the aspirational bar low, but this really does take the shortbread. “Cry Freedom! Our telly will be like RTE”!” The man has a point.

The BBC is wonderful, it carries a global gold standard and for the price of a few beers a month one gets internet, radio, news and an abundance of excellent TV and sport. I can’t say I’ve ever watched RTE, but a Scottish equivalent in place of the BBC would surely be a poorer result.

If voting Yes to independence means saying farewell to the BBC, then many sitting at home will be thinking again.

For me, the straightforward solution is simply to keep the BBC post-independence. “But there’s no longer a Britain” people complain, which is factually incorrect aside from anything else as it is the political entity ‘the UK’ that is at risk of being broken up, not the geographically sound Britain. The British Broadcasting Corporation will still have a natural home whatever the outcome in 2014 is.

Nowhere in the rules for what faces us over the next couple of years is a diktat that independence must involve shutting ourselves off from the rest of the world. We can keep the Queen, keep the pound and keep the BBC if we want (and rUK wants). We can decide for ourselves how we run things. See how much fun this is? Sure, it’s independence-lite, or Devo Max heavy, depending on your point of view and/or party colours, but there’s nothing wrong with going for the optimal deal rather than the black of white visions of a future that is being sold to us. If it’s the BBC that is worrying you about voting Yes, just head to any European country and gaze in wonder at the healthy cross-fertilisation of TV networks across the many, many borders on the Continent.

I have to say, to address the other aspect of David’s article, the flurry of flag waving that has been going on since several weeks ago, I am similarly confounded by the suggestion that all these gold medals will mean Scots will rush to vote No to independence. Now, I happen to think that a flood of No votes will indeed be one unhappy direct result of the Olympics, but I’m as happy for Mo Farah and Vicky Pendleton winning their medals as I am for the US’ Ryan Lochte and Aussie Sally Pearson.

Even though Scottish successes for Chris Hoy etc did give me that patriotic rush of delight at the time; at the end of the day, they won their success through working their backsides off in their own time and on their own dime. It’s got naff all to do with me and naff all to do with Scotland’s constitutional setup, though people are of course free to vote for whatever reason tickles their fancy.

So, unionists are seemingly already backslapping themselves on a job well done but their current high standing may well be built on shifting sands. There is nothing tangible behind an Olympic feel good spirit (other than a £24bn price tag) and there is no reason why Scotland should necessarily feel any attachment to London institutions, irrespective of how popular they may be outwith our current borders.

Another guest article from Alasdair Stirling, to follow up a very well received Referendum Round-up from earlier in the month. Aasdair describes himself as cynical of politicians and believes that we should reject all authority which we cannot justify by reason, but believes that politics that delivers the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers can be virtuous.

With at least some of the post-Olympics opinion polls lending support to the Unionist contention that TeamGB successes have ushered forth a celebration of Britishness that is turning Scots heads away from independence, it is worthwhile considering how devolution may develop if the Scots do vote NO in 2014.  Whether Donald Dewar ever referred to devolution as “a process not an event” is neither here nor there.  The concept is what is important, and whoever said it (it was in fact Ron Davies the Welsh Secretary) was bang on the money.  Devolution did not start in 1997 and (absent a YES vote) is unlikely to have reached a conclusion with the Scotland Act 2012.

From a faltering and short lived mid nineteenth century campaign (Devine 2006) the impetus for specifically Scottish political institutions, and local control thereof, developed and progressed throughout the remainder of the century.  Although never matching the tempo or intensity of Irish demands for Home Rule, this gradual but growing pressure saw a dedicated education department empowered to conduct school inspections in 1872 (O’Connor & Robertson 2000) and resulted in the reappointment of a Scottish Secretary in 1885.  These were tentative steps down the ‘devolution highway’ and further progress came only slowly.  It was not until 1928 that the Scottish Board of Health (created 1919), Board of Agriculture for Scotland (created 1911) and the Prison Commissioners for Scotland (created 1877) were abolished as semi-independent bodies and re-established as departments of the Scottish Office (HMSO 1928).  Westminster tidied up these ‘devolved’ responsibilities by amalgamating prisons, agriculture and fisheries to form a Scottish Home Department in 1939 (HMSO 1939).  This reorganization also saw the Scottish Office opening its resplendent new offices in St Andrew’s House and, more importantly, gaining dedicated civil service support.

These developments created, in effect, the apparatus of a ‘pocket’ government for Scotland, complete with is own ‘pocket’ Prime Minister (the Scottish Secretary), a ‘pocket’ executive (the Scottish Office Ministers and Departments) and ‘pocket’ secretariat (the Scottish section of the Home Civil Service).  However, they were not the whole sum and substance of the devolution’s progress: Westminster itself was also in on the act.  Starting with a Scottish standing committee established in 1909, Scottish MPs progressively came to dominate the consideration and legislative process of exclusively Scottish Bills.  This arrangement developed as the century wore on, eventually becoming the grandly titled the Scottish Grand Committee (Scotland Office 2000).  Whilst never entirely excluding English, Welsh and Northern Irish MPs, this ‘pocket’ parliament nevertheless represented a significant further devolution of power by ensuring that Scottish MPs had a disproportionate influence over legislation affecting only Scottish voters.

With the wounds of 1979 still fresh in the memory, many a Nationalist has branded David Cameron’s much reported claim that he is open to ‘considering what further powers could be devolved’ after a NO vote (STV 2012) as ‘jam tomorrow’ and most likely just another example of Unionist perfidy.  So is his position just a worthless promise, easily broken once a NO vote lances the independence boil, or can the Scots take him at face value?  To its credit, Westminster has a substantial and honourable record when it comes to devolving power to Scotland.  Scottish Labour likes to claim the devolution mantle, but in truth all of the major Westminster parties have embraced the devolution process over its long history and may take some of the credit for having the constitutional flexibility and political will to develop a form of government that is to some extent responsive to Scotland’s particular needs.  So to answer the question: Scots voters can and should take David Cameron at his word when he says that a NO result in the referendum would not be ‘the end of the road’ for devolution (STV 2012).

However, nobody should read more into it than that.  What is important is what is not being said.  To date, no Unionist party nor any high ranking Unionist politician has made any specific undertaking on what further powers might be devolved to a post referendum Scotland or (perhaps more importantly) when any further devolution might take place.  Much is made of the need for clarity in the vote, of lack of consensus on what further powers might be devolved and of the complexity of crafting a proposal that voters might readily understand.  Without doubting the difficulty of these issues; ‘where there is a will there is a way’.

There are many constitutional models already operating successfully throughout the world that might serve to inform a debate on the shape of further devolution.  No doubt Quebec’s arrangements with Ottawa or the Australian state’s relationship with Canberra are a worthwhile study.  However, the constraints of European Union membership, mean that the templates that would most likely to be relevant to enhanced devolution in Scotland would come from within Europe itself.  This need not be a limitation, there exists is a rich diversity of arrangements: the autonomous regions of Spain, the German lander and closer to home the Isle of Man and Channel Islands readily spring to mind as useful starting points.
The plain fact is that it is not beyond the best Unionist brains to act quickly and outline a comprehensible template for Devo-Max that could form the basis of second or Devo-Max question.  So why this reluctance to explore the possible future of devolution?  It is far from a vow of silence.  That Unionism has set its face against a second question is actually most eloquent, and speaks volumes as to Unionist intentions for Scotland’s constitutional future.  What they are saying: the Unionist promise, in effect, is that in the event of a NO vote the the process of devolution will continue along much the same lines and at much the same pace as it has over the last 127 years.  

Perhaps it is cynical, but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Westminster really only embraces devolution when it is confronting a serious Nationalist threat.  Was it by chance that it allowed semi-independent bodies for prisons, health and agriculture in Scotland and re-appointed a Scottish Secretary just as the Irish campaign for Home Rule gained strength?  Did the creation of the Scottish Office in 1928 have anything to do with Britain having fought and lost a bloody war against Irish Nationalists?  Is it fair to suggest that devolution stalled during the period from 1940 to 1970 because there was no real threat from Irish or Scottish Nationalists?  Can we attribute the Scotland Act 1978 to fear born of Scotland’s oil fuelled enthusiasm for the SNP?  Did George Robertson reveal Westminster’s true intentions in the mid-1990s when he said that ‘devolution will kill nationalism stone dead’?  Would Kenneth Calman ever have chaired his commission had Scottish Labour won the election in 2007?
It doesn’t take the wisdom of Solomon to answer these questions, nor is a crystal ball really necessary to foresee Scotland’s constitutional prospects in the event of 2014 NO vote.  Although no longer leader, it is hard to believe that Gordon Brown’s recent speech – all but ruling out a move toward fiscal autonomy (Telegraph 2012) – is far from Scottish Labour’s view of, and preferred approach to further devolution.  At the other end of the political spectrum, David Cameron has already warmed over the ‘Real Devolution’ theme, beloved by the Tories in the 1990’s, in an attempt to recast future devolution in the context of local councils rather than further powers for the Scottish government (Independent 2012).
Such views are more than idle speculation, they are the genesis of Unionism’s post referendum policy and represent the likely boundaries to Scotland’s future constitutional development.  In practical terms they mean that, free from the fear of Nationalism, Westminster will most likely restrict future devolution to piecemeal powers devolved from the periphery of their current reserved responsibilities (e.g. international development, the civil service or broadcasting).  Moreover, with only seven major events (appointment of the Scottish Secretary, formation of the Scottish Office, creation of a dedicated secretariat, the evolution of the Scottish Grand Committee and the 1978, 1998 and 2012 Scotland Acts) throughout Scottish devolution’s 127 year history, it is arithmetically unlikely that Westminster will be minded to pass another Scotland Act much before 2030.

One of my favourite facets of modern politics is cross-dressing, outperforming your rivals at the polls by stealing (or more likely borrowing for a very short period) their policies and their voters. One could argue that the SNP is succeeding at the polls because it is out-Labouring Labour, and long may it continue while the latter attempts to uncomfortably straddle the right and left wings of Scottish and British politics.

As the independence timeline continues (I refuse to call it a ‘debate’ until it actually is one) and while the unionist side continues to dominate, in no small part due to its particularly positive and nifty catchphrase ‘Better Together’, I can’t help but wonder if the SNP shouldn’t, well, nick it.

Scotland can, after all, be better if it chooses to pull together. The UK also can, but only to a limited extent, for perfectly logical reasons.

Scotland’s solo political journey has already started from the smoking ban through minimum pricing at 50p to keeping university tuition free in the face of £9k fees down south. We can, and should, be doing a lot, lot more and still suffer from a poverty of ambition but, irrespective of how short or far we choose to set our sights, a distinctly Scottish constitutional setup is best placed to deliver that for us.

That’s easy to say and harder to prove but here are several inter-connected reasons why I believe Scotland can be better together in a way that would be unthinkable across the UK.

– No Nuclear Weapons.
It is said so often that the potency of the argument becomes diluted, which is a shame. Nuclear weapons, so costly to build, maintain and replace are so particularly wasteful as they will quite simply never be deliberately fired. There is no enemy, real or imagined, that any right-thinking Scot would wish a nuclear weapon on and that alone is reason enough to stop holding and paying for them.
Indeed, decreased defence spending, a prospect so patently unpalatable across most of England, would free up at least £2bn a year for Scotland to spend in other areas. That is a direction that the UK will unfortunately not take for as long as those at Westminster wish to try keeping up with the USA and retain their permanent seat at the United Nations.

– Green Energy
A nation cannot invest simultaneously in nuclear power and renewable energy to the level necessary for both to be world leading. We have dilapidated stations of the former and the greatest potential in Europe, if not the world, for the latter, and that marginal pound can only go to one or the other.
Chris Huhne, the (former) Environment Minister, whose well-meaning principles were ultimately stymied by coalition pragmatism, sold the Lib Dems out on their promise of opposition to nuclear and the facts are, despite Huhne’s assurances of no public subsidy (now abandoned), that all nuclear power has cost the taxpayer eye watering sums in the past and will cost even more in the future. The British tax payer has already spent £100bn on nuclear clean up costs already. £100bn. And we’re building eight more of them south of the border.

rUK has hitherto had minimal appetite to facilitate Scotland’s renewables revolution, so freeing up Defence spending to invest in green energy at this crucial, crucial juncture seems like an opportunity Scotland can ill afford to ignore. It is considerably less likely to happen inside a UK context.

– The End to Boom and Bust
A Scot may have made this hollow promise before but I firmly believe that of the constituent nations of the UK, it is Scotland that has the right size, sentiment and steadiness to deliver an economy that is sustainable for the long term.

The Scottish subsample of UK polls regularly show that Scotland is the region with the lowest support for George Osborne’s economic policies but also the region with the highest level of ‘Don’t knows’. In other words, we know something is wrong but can’t seem to work out what to do about it.

An answer may lie not in GDP tables but in the many ‘Happiness Indices‘ that consider life expectancy, literacy, standard of living, quality of life and child welfare. Scotland is, of course, not included but the top 10 in Europe is dominated by countries such as Norway (1st), Ireland (3rd), Sweden (6th), Iceland (8th) and Denmark (9th). Indeed, if you strip out Germany as an outlier (5th, population 82m), then the average population size of the remaining nine countries that are the happiest according to the UN is 6.6m. Smaller is better is the clear message.

The UK, incidentally, is 19th, one place ahead of Greece, and what does “Better Together” mean if not ‘happier together’?

– International Relations
The Iraq War is old news and not, in itself, a reason to want to distance ourselves from the UK, but there is no denying that Scotland could hold its head up higher in a global context if it had a distinctly Scottish viewpoint that it was able to get across from the EU to the UN or, dare I say it, NATO. The Chinese words for England and the United Kingdom are the same. If that’s not enough to put a bit of fire into wanting the world to know that Scotland exists, then I don’t know what would.

Scotland’s view of the world is too often at odds with the rest of the UK’s view of the world for the assurance that we, as the UK, are better together to hold much weight and, furthermore, who is more likely to win business for Scotland on trade missions, David Cameron, Boris Johnson or A.N. Other Tory Prime Minister who can only ever expect to win a few Scottish seats at election time or the First Minister, be it Alex Salmond or whoever is next in line. The ship, perhaps, has already sailed on who is fighting Scotland’s corner abroad.

Would a Scottish Gary McKinnon still be facing extradition to the US? Would a Scottish Richard O’Dwyer? I can’t help but think that a nation that unflinchingly grasped the Megrahi nettle would come to a similarly civilised and correct decision in the more open and shut cases that it faced, rather than meekly abiding to a one-way extradition treaty with the US.

I accept that the unionists will not be knocking my door down here in leafy London but I don’t know what the specifics of the Better Together case is and can’t really imagine what it could be. From the Economy, through Defence, to Power Production, and given that the NHS and Education are already separate and diverging, in what context is the UK going to improve Scotland moreso than a separate Scotland making its own decisions would? Even Team GB at our ‘home’ Olympics for our national sport didn’t have the good grace to include a Scot in the squad, let alone the lineup.

‘Better Together’ is a persuasive phrase, but it’s more up for grabs than many on both sides of the independence discussion bargain for.

Call it a foible, but I’m always very careful with my language. I always ask for a cola at the bar rather than a coke, I always make sure I use the correct term of Britain, Great Britain or UK depending on the situation and I always refer to Scotland the nation rather than Scotland the country.

That was my approach before today at least. However, as has been pointed out to me (by James), Scotland is actually, or at least can accurately be referred to as, a country. Consequently, I may have to rethink some things.

“A country is a region legally identified as a distinct entity in political geography. A country may be an independent sovereign state or one that is occupied by another state, as a non-sovereign or formerly sovereign political division, or a geographic region associated with sets of previously independent or differently associated peoples with distinct political characteristics” – Wikipedia

You can understand therefore that my mind is now all aflutter with regard the latest suggested independence question from the unionist camp:

‘Scotland should be an independent state. Agree/Disagree’

For me, the word ‘state’ conjurs up images of US states (e.g. Nebraska) or rogue states (e.g. Libya), neither constitutional arrangements that I would equate with the SNP’s ambition of an independent Scotland. France, to me, is not a state, Brazil is not a state, they are countries, and that is what Scotland should aspire to be, glossing over the fact, of course, that it is one already, apparently.

So, my initial reaction to this new suggested question was to consider that the following would be a considerable improvement:

‘Scotland should be an independent country. Agree/Disagree’

However, as above, and no doubt in many a person’s mind (albeit not mine), Scotland is a country already, so what exactly would we be voting on? Lawyers, lick your lips now.

The leaders of both sides of the debate may not always act like it, but a basic requirement of whatever the independence question turns out to be is that it should mitigate any risk of legal dubiety or public confusion. I have to gloomily conclude that the inclusion of ‘country’ risks inducing that very problem, though I still personally rail against the term ‘state’.

Alex Salmond’s supposed preference (assuming he really does prefer to just have the one question as opposed to two), is as follows:

Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent country?

The ‘agree’ element of the question is supposedly loaded, though those objecting didn’t seem to mind so much when the remarkably similar devolution question was asked: “I agree that there should be a Scottish Parliament.”

Perhaps therefore, the optimal question and the best compromise is as follows:

‘Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent state?’ Yes/No

The panel that came up with the question announced today are Lord Stewart Sutherland, Dr Matt Qvortrup and Ron Gould, as set up by Labour, the Lib Dems and the Conservatives. Male, pale and stale one could argue, but independent experts nonetheless, albeit with singularly biased paymasters.

I suspect, as subtle and insignificant the differences may to many appear to be, that to “agree” or not to agree will not be the only question for this particular question, but a debate around ‘country’ versus ‘state’ is only really just getting going.

For me, I’m knackered just thinking about it, and given today’s self-searching revelations about what is a country and what isn’t, I’m dropping my opinions for now and just going to sit back as the debate ensues.

With a cola, because at least some definitions are still dependable.

What’s the state of play with the #indyref? Today a guest roundup from Alasdair Stirling, who describes himself as cynical of politicians and believes that we should reject all authority which we cannot justify by reason, but believes that politics that delivers the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers can be virtuous.

With the launch of both the Yes and No campaigns we can now see an outline of the basic strategies with which the opposing sides of the debate will likely fight the referendum. For their part the No campaign seem to have adopted a Salmond/SNP focused variation of their tried and tested ‘Too Wee, Too Poor and Too Stupid’ strategy. Basically they are attacking Salmond (questioning his judgement, courage, associations and commitment to independence itself) and rubbishing any SNP plan or proposal for post-independence Scotland as wishful thinking and/or fanciful nonsense (because ipso facto Scotland is too wee, too poor and too stupid).

That the gods have blessed the No campaign with fortuitous timing is beyond question. The Jubilee and Olympics have provided a drum beat of ‘feel-good’ news pushing the United Kingdom and its most fundamental institution into every living room. Moreover, launching against a background of increasingly horrific ‘euro-catastrophe’ speculation cannot but have helped prepare a favourable reception for the ‘Better Together’ message. However, it would be wrong to suggest that the recent opinion poll swing against independence is solely due to the No campaign’s good fortune or a compliant media.

The No campaign has scored some very serious hits and deserves credit therefor. Whatever their merits, the SNP’s plans for an independent Scotland’s currency and financial regulation seem to lack detail and coherence, but more importantly the plans as set forth clearly rely on the rUK government agreeing to participate in the proposed arrangements. The No campaigners have therefore found it all too easy to assert that the rUK government will have no truck with the SNP’s plans, or if they do it will be on such terms as will render independence meaningless. The Yes campaign has not yet constructed a viable narrative against this assertion and, frankly, in the public mind the Nationalist plans and proposals stand guilty as charged: i.e. wishful thinking and fanciful nonsense.

Notwithstanding its initial success, the plain fact is that the No campaign has some serious vulnerabilities. It has chosen to focus on a definitive in/out of the Union decision with any plan or proposals for further or enhanced devolution reserved to the post referendum world. Objectively, this is a viable strategy, however the 1979 referendum has left a long folk memory of Westminster gerrymandering and broken promises. Despite the Prime Minister being open to further devolution and/or Labour and Liberal Democrat cogitations on further powers, the Westminster political establishment is very firmly rooted in the constitutional status quo, and No campaigners remain vulnerable to the charge that (absent a political threat from the SNP) Scotland will have no further constitutional change of any substance.

Perhaps not surprisingly, recent opinion polls have the Scottish Labour cognisanti licking their lips at the prospect of Salmond’s political demise and looking forward to a ‘post-SNP’ world with Labour’s political ascendancy re-established, the Tories returned to their rightful place as Scotland’s permanent minority opposition and the SNP “restored to what they ought to be, an eccentric fringe Party: somewhat less serious than the Greens but still a bit more coherent than the Liberal Democrats”. At the other end of the extreme, columnists such as Alan Cochrane and Iain Martin have already speculated on ‘Devo-Minus’ – perhaps half in fun half in earnest, but probably characteristic of a large slice of fundamentalist Unionist thinking.

These sorts of politically partisan objectives are becoming an increasingly vocal fringe to the No campaign, but seem to run counter to the core message of the very opinion polls that give their proponents such hope. Reading opinion poll runes is a notoriously uncertain science, but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that these vocal fringes are driving the No campaign to ignore the only indications of the electorate’s preferences simply because an in/out option best serves their partisan ends. It remains to be seen whether the Scottish voters share Labour’s desire to kill off the SNP or are minded to give uber-Unionists licence to reduce the legislative scope of the Scottish Parliament. It is early days, but there is a real danger that it if the No campaign allows these partisan political objectives to dominate its mainstream campaign and message then it runs the risk of alienating itself from an electorate that is disinterested in politics and generally holds politicians in contempt.

The No campaign’s message – probably inevitably having decided to focus on a defence of the status quo – is relentlessly negative. It is all very well saying that you believe that Scotland would be viable as an independent country, but if your every pronouncement focuses on: Salmond’s failings, the SNP’s weaknesses and a host of (good, bad and indifferent) reasons why an independent Scotland is a non-starter you are running a negative campaign. Put aside the question of whether the electorate has any stomach for a relentless two year barrage of negativity, the No campaign may be making a serious mistake with this approach. It is an article of faith that No campaigners must publicly agree that Scotland could be viable as an independent country; what happens – how do they respond – if/when the Yes campaign presents voters with a viable and believable independence narrative?

Finally and perhaps most importantly, the No campaign may be misunderstanding DevoMax minded voters. Poll after poll shows somewhere between 20-30% of the Scottish electorate inclined to support enhanced devolution. With independence and the status quo commanding only circa 30% of the vote, these are crucial voters. It is difficult to know what motivates them, but their inclination toward Devo-Max is characteristic of a broad phenomenon developing across Scottish society. The Scottish Social Attitudes Survey data suggests that Scots are transferring or have transferred their focus and trust from the established Westminster institutions to the emergent Holyrood ones. In this process, Scots do not seem to be driven by ‘Braveheart’ patriotism or narrow national identity; it appears to be a cold calculation based on growing confidence in the Scottish Parliament as the nation’s principal political forum and the institution that they most trust to further Scottish interests.

The No campaign’s in/out vote status quo strategy swims against this tide and they appear to be premising their campaign on the assumption that while DevoMax inclined voters may flirt with ill-defined notions of enhanced devolution, they remain at heart loyal to the concept of Britain and its Westminster-centred political institutions, and, if sufficiently scared of ‘Alex in Salmondland’, will follow their fundamental instincts and vote for the status quo. Most seriously, the reluctance to engage in the DevoMax debate and/or offer a reliable route to enhanced devolution leaves the No campaign having to rely on voters’ fears, and most importantly means that it is unable to articulate a vision for Scotland that appeals to the the hopes and aspirations of those voters currently ill served by the current Westminster focused political settlement, and who may see this referendum as the politicians’ opportunity to offer them the prospect of a better future.

As regards the Yes campaign, there are many failures and missed opportunities to consider. However, the first and (arguably) the most serious is the fact that the SNP’s plans and proposals for a post-independence Scotland aren’t even gaining much traction with committed independence supporters. A quick scan of the conversations on nationalist blogs shows that the policies that have had an outing – the pound, financial regulation and defence etc. – have not set the nationalist heather alight, to put it mildly. It is early days, but if the SNP aren’t really selling these policies to the thoughtful commentators of ‘Better Nation’, then the Yes campaign is in some serious trouble.

To be fair, these policies have a great deal more substance than their reception suggests. History tells us that a new state emerges by one of two basic routes and that the route taken does much to define the character of the emergent state and (in particular) its relationship with the demitting state. Where the route to independence is through a bitter armed conflict (e.g. America, Ireland and Algeria) a wide gulf opens up between the emergent and the demitting states and there tends to be little visible coordination and cooperation between the two after independence. Conversely, where a state emerges through a peaceful process of constitutional negotiation (e.g. Canada, Australia and New Zealand) there is a great deal of continuing cooperation between the emergent and demitting states.

In particular the emergent state often relies very heavily on its continuing use of the demitting state’s political, social and economic institutions until it develops its own arrangements. No campaigners have made much of the thought that this sort of post-independence continuity of institutions degrades the reality and/or integrity of an independent Scotland’s status. It is a poor argument (who questions the reality or validity of Canadian, Australian or New Zealand independence) but they are currently making it successfully, and unless the Yes campaign find a convincing narrative to explain the merits of such proposals these attacks will continue to damage their prospects of success. However, despite their troubles in this area, if the Yes campaign finds the necessary narrative the idea of independent Scotland continuing to share institutions with the remaining United Kingdom could very well receive a favourable hearing from voters: in particular from those inclined to a Devo-Max arrangement.

The SNP have made much of the virtue of positive campaigning; and in particular its role in their 2011 election success. Without doubting the merits of this approach, the ‘happy-clappy’ tenor of the Yes campaign so far suggests that many Yes campaigners may not yet really understand the nature of the battle to which they are joined (conversely, the No campaigners seem to fully understand what is at stake). Remember, history shows us that: American Loyalists had no place in independent America; Unionists had no place in independent Ireland; and the Pied Noir had no place in independent Algeria. At the other end of the spectrum, for the powers that be in London this referendum is effectively a ‘ballot box’ rebellion against the United Kingdom constitution and its institutions – and we all know what happens to the leaders and supporters of a failed rebellion.

Perhaps it is because the current generation of Nationalists have grown up in the softer accommodating world of devolutionist Unionism. Whatever the reason, Yes campaigners who (for example) complain of unfair media bias or those that make comfortable assumptions about Westminster’s future intentions very quickly need to come to terms with the ruthless and determined nature of old-school Unionism – if not it is a mistake that will likely cost them and Scotland dear. Yes campaigners should be very aware that, whatever their best intentions, there will be no shaking hands and letting bygones be bygones when the result is declared. This referendum is a very high stakes game, not only because it challenges the deepest foundations of the UK state but because the losers lose everything. Scottish Labour (and many in the mainstream Scottish media) may now be relishing the prospect of ‘cleaning house’ after an SNP defeat – but they know (all too well) that if the result goes the other way then as the cheerleaders of the former Union they will have no place in the public life of an independent Scotland.

Of course with the likely date of the referendum being 2014, we have seen no more than the campaign’s opening salvos and whilst both the Yes and No campaigns are already campaigning actively, the real action of the referendum is still in the strategic positioning around its process. Whilst many eloquent voices in the blogosphere – Gerry Hassan, Better Nation and the Burd – are calling for both campaigns to set out an inspiring vision for Scotland’s future and engage in a thoughtful discussion of their proposals, this understandable view perhaps misunderstands the importance of the strategic manoeuvring.

Low politics these manoeuvres may be (and they are certainly not inspiring), but it is impossible to overstate the importance of the Devo-Max second question. The Unionist parties have already come out firmly against it. This must be so, if Scotland were to vote for Devo-Max, such a vote would commit the Unionist parties to delivering a policy that they cannot, and will not, be able to deliver without the approval of the wider British electorate (either in a general election or single issue referendum) – which of course they may not do. Moreover, it is doubtful that the Unionist parties could sell proposals for further devolution to their English/Welsh and Northern Irish MPs before the current Scotland Act has bedded in and proved its worth. Accordingly, even if the Unionist parties are minded to deliver further devolution and could overcome these difficulties, it is unlikely that any proposal for enhanced devolution (the DevoMax second question) could or would reach the statute book until well after the 2025 Westminster election.

It falls therefore to Alex Salmond to carry the Devo-Max torch and keep the idea of a second question alive. From a Unionist point of view, this is simply to ensure that SNP get a ‘consolation prize’ in a contest that the Unionists believe that the SNP themselves know they cannot win. Unfortunately, this is a self-serving argument and doesn’t stand up to much scrutiny. The evidence from almost every opinion poll suggests that Devo-Max would win the referendum by some distance. Why therefore does Alex Salmond want the Devo-Max question? The answer is that the SNP no more wants a Devo-Max question than the Unionist parties do. What the SNP wants is that the voters (and in particular the Devo-Max inclined voters) blame the Unionist parties for denying them the chance of voting for this constitutional arrangement.

We already know the No campaign narrative: ‘the UK can discuss further devolution after Scotland decides whether it is in or out of the Union’. As for the Yes campaign we can only guess, but it will likely run something along the lines of: ‘we tried to get Devo-Max on the ballot, but the Unionists prevented it so if you want Scotland to have further powers, independence really is your only option’. Of course, it is in this context that the SNP’s redefining of independence (keep the Queen and the pound etc.) starts to make sense. The SNP are gambling (but it’s probably a good gamble) that if denied the option on the ballot, Devo-Max inclined voters will cast their votes for an independence that looks remarkably like the Devo-Max arrangement that they wanted.

Getting rid of Devo-Max – and making sure the Unionists get the blame for it – really is the SNP’s only possible route to referendum success. When Alex Salmond floats the Devo-Max option or proposes a second question on the ballot, it is simply to force opposition from the Unionists (who reliably oppose the matter without thinking). All in all it’s not too much of a stretch to suggest that the outcome of these Devo-Max and second question manoeuvrings will decide the referendum result. Neither side wants (or can live or succeed with) a second question, but whose ever narrative the Devo-Max inclined voters believe will likely pick up most of their votes and win the referendum.

The military historian and strategist B.H. Liddell Hart said: ‘The profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies of their men.’ More simply put: ‘the man who runs the battle wins the battle’; and although and we are still in the opening ‘Phony War’ stages of the campaign, Alex Salmond is still very much running the battle. For all the No campaign’s early victories, these are just the opening skirmishes and the strategic initiative remains with Alex Salmond – it is still his referendum to win!